These positions may coincide with presidential election cycles, such as the director of the Office of Personnel Management, or may overlap with administrations like the director of the FBI.
Fixed-term appointments also are common for members of boards and commissions. Typically, these positions are set for periods of four to seven years and often expire in a staggered manner. An analysis of current Senate-confirmed positions suggests that positions with fixed-length terms tend to share certain characteristics, including stability.
The stability benefits associated with term positions, however, rely on them being consistently filled by qualified appointees who are capable of serving competently through and across administrations. The types of positions that lend themselves to fixed terms may also be good subjects for holdover practices, with appointees remaining on the job until their replacement is confirmed.
This could occur across administrations, for the short term or indefinitely. Some are already informally and consistently treated this way, including U. For example, the current director of the National Institutes of Health, Dr. Francis Collins, was appointed by President Obama and confirmed by the Senate in He was asked to remain in his position by both President Trump and President Biden.
By formally converting appropriate roles to term position and monitoring their use or otherwise encouraging holdovers, the Senate could encourage stability and expertise in critical roles while maintaining its advisory power and helping reduce its workload.
Other positions filled by subject-matter experts in roles demanding Senate approval, such as undersecretary for health at the Department of Veterans Affairs, remained vacant during the Trump administration and could also benefit from this approach.
Stakeholders should consider fixed terms and holdover norms to be two separate but related solutions. The former provides transparent intent to the Senate, the executive branch, appointees and agencies; the latter allows flexibility but is a less clear and stable process and result.
Our analysis of current Senate-confirmed positions reveals two considerations that have led to the embrace of fixed-length terms or cross-administration holdovers. Additional existing positions should be evaluated against these considerations to see if they too would benefit from such a formal change or informal practice. One additional criterion that might be considered for identifying which jobs could be converted to fixed terms of five or more years, or considered for holdover status, is the time it takes for the administration to nominate an individual for the position.
Certain Senate-confirmed positions go unfilled for significantly longer periods of time than others. Another option available to streamline the confirmation and appointment process is to convert specific political jobs to career roles.
Research focusing on agencies and the federal workforce has found that in some cases agencies and bureaus managed by Senate-confirmed appointed career officials have negatively affected agency performance. One of the more aggressive criteria suggests converting all Senate-confirmed positions to career status below secretary and deputy secretary levels who are not themselves agency administrators.
This accounts for close to three-quarters of Senate-confirmed positions on the Executive Schedule. Proponents suggest that long-term commitment to program effectiveness and stability is critical for the functioning of these agencies, and career personnel would be most appropriate. A decrease in Senate-confirmed positions and the career professionalization could additionally eliminate several hundred Schedule C appointees who now serve as executive aides to these appointees.
A more modest approach might convert Senate-confirmed positions at the program and bureau leader level generally assistant secretaries or their equivalent, though not always or exclusively. Filling these positions with career executives may induce officials to stay and build careers in the federal service without sacrificing political accountability, since presidential appointees at the head of agencies will continue to oversee careerist managers.
Another approach would be applying greater positional consistency across agencies, particularly among management roles where deep expertise of public management is necessary. Shifting such roles to career leaders may lead to improved operational performance and lower turnover rates in positions that require stability and expertise not always found outside government careers.
Across the federal government, there are currently full-time appointee positions on 38 executive branch boards and commissions for which the Senate provides advice and consent, and more than additional part-time appointees. Though their responsibilities vary between regulatory, advisory and ceremonial, the main characteristic most commissions share is that they are independent executive branch bodies outside departments and agencies.
Executive branch boards and commissions currently serve various functions within the federal government, ranging from controlling housing projects and protecting marine species to overseeing scholarship programs. Some of these commissions function as independent policy and regulatory agencies with broad responsibilities, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Other executive branch commissions and boards execute a ceremonial or advisory role, such as the Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation. The current number of commissions and boards with Senate-confirmed positions presents a significant challenge for the appointment process.
It is estimated that for nominations confirmed to boards and commissions during the th Congress, despite use of the privileged calendar, days elapsed between nominations and confirmations. There are three possible approaches to address the high number of Senate-confirmed positions on executive branch boards and commissions.
Within the past half-century, Congress and presidents have significantly increased layers of management and political positions in the federal workforce. Across many agencies, there are on average 83 layers between top leadership and essential workers. Identifying redundant and duplicate Senate-confirmed roles across agencies can be challenging. But some are obvious, such as the deputy secretary for management and resources and the undersecretary for management at the State Department—one of few agencies with two such deputies.
The exercise of identifying such positions has the potential to eliminate and reduce the layers of government. A second approach would be to identify and eliminate consistently vacant positions across agencies and departments.
If agencies have successfully navigated these years without Senate-confirmed appointees, the change of status of these positions or, in some cases, their elimination likely will not affect the operation of their organizations.
Congress should carefully examine these long-term vacancies—especially those that span presidential administrations—and determine whether some of the positions could be converted to another type of appointee or eliminated. Any effort at converting Senate-confirmed positions should consider the potential implications for Schedule C positions supporting Senate-confirmed roles.
Though their responsibilities vary, these positions form the personal staffs of agency leaders, including chiefs of staff, special assistants, senior advisers and executive assistants. Cabinet appointees frequently recruit select personal and expert Schedule C staff members to support their complex roles and aid the administration of their agencies. However, such staff also support undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries, and perform roles that could be handled by career civil servants.
Any effort to reduce or convert Senate-confirmed roles could bring with it commensurate decrease in Schedule C staff if the converted or eliminated positions lose their personal staffs. A more aggressive approach might be to limit the number of front office Schedule C staff altogether below the Cabinet level and requiring these roles to be filled by career personnel. Congress might fulfill this approach by instituting a cap or by legislatively restricting the role assignment of Schedule C personnel.
The intention of the Framers in establishing the appointments process was to allow presidents to staff administrations with the very best while limiting the power of the executive branch to install unsuitable candidates or use government positions for personal and political gain. This objective still has merit and should be preserved. Our government works best when it has a full team of capable, qualified and committed individuals serving in career positions and political appointments. However, the current number of Senate-confirmed positions has created a logjam, hindering the ability of administrations to fill critical roles and undermining the effectiveness of the American government.
It is only through cooperation across the executive and legislative branches that the current appointment process can be reformed from the unsustainable status quo. The approaches described in this report are meant to start a conversation aimed at resetting the appointments process while maintaining its core principles and intent.
We believe now is the moment to seriously pursue reform. Without it, our system will continue to struggle. Researchers at the Partnership follow presidential and congressional actions on approximately top executive branch positions, a portion of the roughly 1, positions that require Senate confirmation.
The tracker includes all full-time civilian positions in the executive branch that require Senate confirmation except for judges, marshals and U. Military appointments and part-time positions requiring Senate confirmation are not included. Congress, Policy and Supporting Positions, various years.
In , John F. Kennedy inherited positions; in , Donald Trump inherited 3, Congress, Policy and Supporting Positions, Ogrysko, Nicole. Retrieved from nyti. The role, responsibility and challenge for federal chief information officers in IT investment oversight and information management. Several issues encourage short service, but two are noteworthy, the lack of express commitment to serving longer and inadequate training for the position.
Unconfirmed Why reducing the number of Senate-confirmed positions can make government more effective August 9, For 19 years, the nonpartisan, nonprofit Partnership for Public Service has been dedicated to making the federal government more effective. We work across administrations to help transform the way government operates by increasing collaboration, accountability, efficiency and innovation.
Visit ourpublicservice. Executive Summary. The Unchecked Growth of the Confirmation Process. Executive Summary The federal workforce is composed of about 2 million civil servants who provide continuity across presidential administrations and another 4, political appointees who are selected by the president.
Once created, these positions are hard to reform or eliminate. The confirmation process takes longer than ever before.
The average Senate confirmation process took about twice as long as it did during the Trump days and the Obama administration days than it did during the Reagan administration 56 days. Vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions have significantly increased. During each of the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, Senate-confirmed nominees spent about , cumulative days years mired in the confirmation process.
The short tenures of political appointees combined with these delays result in frequent and extended vacancies across Senate-confirmed positions. If Congress is in session and the President takes no action within 10 days, the bill becomes law. If Congress adjourns before 10 days are up and the President takes no action, then the bill dies and Congress may not vote to override. This is called a pocket veto, and if Congress still wants to pass the legislation, they must begin the entire process anew.
Congress, as one of the three coequal branches of government, is ascribed significant powers by the Constitution.
All legislative power in the government is vested in Congress, meaning that it is the only part of the government that can make new laws or change existing laws. Executive Branch agencies issue regulations with the full force of law, but these are only under the authority of laws enacted by Congress. The President may veto bills Congress passes, but Congress may also override a veto by a two-thirds vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Article I of the Constitution enumerates the powers of Congress and the specific areas in which it may legislate.
Congress is also empowered to enact laws deemed "necessary and proper" for the execution of the powers given to any part of the government under the Constitution. Part of Congress's exercise of legislative authority is the establishment of an annual budget for the government. To this end, Congress levies taxes and tariffs to provide funding for essential government services.
If enough money cannot be raised to fund the government, then Congress may also authorize borrowing to make up the difference. Congress can also mandate spending on specific items: legislatively directed spending, commonly known as "earmarks," specifies funds for a particular project, rather than for a government agency.
Both chambers of Congress have extensive investigative powers, and may compel the production of evidence or testimony toward whatever end they deem necessary.
Members of Congress spend much of their time holding hearings and investigations in committee. Refusal to cooperate with a Congressional subpoena can result in charges of contempt of Congress, which could result in a prison term. The Senate maintains several powers to itself: It ratifies treaties by a two-thirds supermajority vote and confirms the appointments of the President by a majority vote. The consent of the House of Representatives is also necessary for the ratification of trade agreements and the confirmation of the Vice President.
Oversight of the executive branch is an important Congressional check on the President's power and a balance against his discretion in implementing laws and making regulations. A major way that Congress conducts oversight is through hearings. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs are both devoted to overseeing and reforming government operations, and each committee conducts oversight in its policy area.
Founded in as the General Accounting Office, its original mission was to audit the budgets and financial statements sent to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Today, the GAO audits and generates reports on every aspect of the government, ensuring that taxpayer dollars are spent with the effectiveness and efficiency that the American people deserve. The executive branch also polices itself: Sixty-four Inspectors General, each responsible for a different agency, regularly audit and report on the agencies to which they are attached.
The Legislative Branch. Powers of Congress Congress, as one of the three coequal branches of government, is ascribed significant powers by the Constitution.
Congress also holds the sole power to declare war. Second, how many appointments are withdrawn and returned? Because the available data do not allow for systematic explorations before the Reagan administration, over-time comparisons are limited. Still, some trends do begin to emerge.
First, the confirmation process has grown longer. Six years later, in the first session of the th Congress, the confirmation process had dragged out to 87 days, more than twice the figure and almost three times that of The comparisons are skewed somewhat by the Republican control of the Senate in and the less urgent, less visible nature of confirming appointees late in an administration, as opposed to the initial round of appointments that receive considerable attention given the need to put a government in place a few weeks after the November election.
Still, the process has grown longer, both early and late in an administration. Thus the typical confirmation process averaged almost three months when Congress was in session. Taking into account the 34 days of late-summer congressional recess, the confirmation process of averaged days—almost exactly four months. The positions, of course, did not necessarily remain vacant, because the Federal Vacancies Reform Act allowed acting officials to fill many slots.
Still, the lengthening Senate confirmation process indicates that a problem does exist—all the more so given the increasing time that the president has taken to make appointments. How often does the Senate return appointments to the president or cause nominations to be withdrawn? Again, looking at the rates under differing circumstances makes sense. The president is likely to do better with appointments he makes right after being elected than with any other, and divided government may affect confirmation rates.
As reported in table 1, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton fared about the same in winning confirmation for their nominees. To the extent that a trend emerges, it reinforces the inference that the Senate has put up more obstacles over time. But Clinton faced a Republican Senate for the entire six-year stretch, while Reagan dealt with a Democratic chamber only in his last two years, when his confirmation rate fell to At the same time, President Clinton did win confirmation of 96 percent of his nominees in the first two years of his administration, albeit with less dispatch than did Ronald Reagan in This leads us to consider whether the Senate is truly the culprit here and, if it is, whether anything might be done to affect the way the chamber handles the confirmation process.
Nevertheless, convincing evidence does exist that the Senate has become both more individualistic and more partisan. Barbara Sinclair, for example, reports steady growth in filibusters over the past 40 years, especially in the past 20, and Sarah Binder and Steven Smith demonstrate that the use of filibusters continues to reflect the policy goals of individual senators, groups of senators, and, at times, the minority party.
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